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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On March 9, 2005, a jury in Louisiana state court found Jesse Jay 
Montejo guilty of first-degree murder.1 The jury sentenced Montejo to 
death the next day after three hours of deliberation.2 Montejo alleged 
twenty assignments of error in his appeal to the Louisiana Supreme 
Court,3 and the court addressed all but two of his assignments of error 
in an unpublished appendix to its opinion.4 
The two other assignments of error, which the Louisiana Supreme 
Court analyzed fully in the opinion rather than summarily in the 
unpublished appendix, dealt with purported violations of Montejo’s 
Fifth5 and Sixth Amendment rights.6 On January 16, 2008, the court 
held that neither right had been violated,7 and then denied Montejo’s 
petition for rehearing on March 7, 2008.8 Montejo filed a petition for 
writ of certiorari on June 5, 2008.9 
 
 * 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1238–39 (La. 2008). 
 2. Id. at 1241. 
 3. Id. at 1250. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1251. 
 6. Id. at 1258. The court also reviewed Montejo’s death penalty sentence, as required by 
Louisiana law, for any “passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors.” Id. at 1263. 
 7. Id. at 1258, 1262. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238 (La. 2008), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 
3358 (U.S. June 5, 2008) (No. 07-1529). 
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The Supreme Court granted Montejo’s petition on October 1, 
2008, and scheduled oral arguments for January 13, 2009,10 to address 
Montejo’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but not his purported 
Fifth Amendment violations.11 The question presented is: “When an 
indigent defendant’s right to counsel has attached and counsel has 
been appointed, must the defendant take additional affirmative steps 
to ‘accept’ the appointment in order to secure the protections of the 
Sixth Amendment and preclude police-initiated interrogation without 
counsel present?”12 
II.  FACTS 
On September 6, 2002, police brought Montejo in for 
questioning.13 Montejo was a close friend and associate of Jerry 
Moore—the man the police believed had planned the murder of 
Lewis Ferrari the day before.14 The police interviewed Montejo from 
4:30 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. on September 6, and then from 3:00 a.m. to 
4:00 a.m. on September 7.15 The videotapes from these two interviews 
proved to be pivotal to the State’s case: they showed that “Montejo 
slowly made increasingly incriminating statements until he finally 
admitted that he shot the victim who had unexpectedly returned 
home and interrupted Montejo’s burglary.”16 Altogether, by the 
completion of second interview, Montejo had told police six different 
versions of how the crime occurred—all of which were drastically 
different.17 
On the morning of September 10—four days after Ferrari’s 
murder and three days after Montejo’s initial interrogation—Montejo 
appeared in court for a mandatory initial hearing.18 At this hearing, 
the judge appointed the Office of the Indigent Defenders to represent 
Montejo.19 The record from this hearing does not indicate that 
 
 10. Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. June 5, 2008), available at 
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-1529.htm. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. June 5, 2008), available at 
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/07-01529qp.pdf. 
 13. Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1244 (La. 2008); see also Brief for Petitioner at 
1, Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2008). 
 14. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1241. 
 15. Id. at 1244. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1248. 
 18. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1249; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6. 
 19. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1249; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 7. 
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Montejo “accepted” this appointment of counsel—the facts suggest 
that Montejo did not say anything during this hearing.20 
After the hearing, Montejo was brought back to the Sheriff’s 
Office and asked by Detective Hall what he had done with the 
murder weapon.21 Detective Hall was not aware that the Office of the 
Indigent Defenders had been appointed to represent Montejo earlier 
that morning.22 After being re-Mirandized, Montejo agreed to 
accompany detectives in their search for the murder weapon and 
other evidence.23 The police, however, never found the murder 
weapon despite Montejo’s assistance.24  
While sitting in the back of the police car on the trip to look for 
the weapon, Montejo wrote an apology letter to the victim’s widow in 
which he asked for forgiveness and explained that he intended only to 
commit a burglary, that he had a gun merely to frighten victims, but 
that he shot her husband only when he was unable either to frighten 
him or to escape without violence.25 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The disposition of Montejo v. Louisiana hinges on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Michigan v. Jackson.26 In Jackson, Bladel was 
charged with murdering three railroad employees.27 At his 
arraignment, Bladel requested that counsel be appointed for him 
because he was indigent.28 A notice of appointment was mailed to a 
local law firm, but the firm did not receive it until four days after 
Bladel’s arraignment.29 The day before the law firm received the 
letter, two detectives approached Bladel, advised him of his Miranda 
rights, and obtained a confession.30 Bladel inquired about his 
representation following the arraignment, but was not told that a law 
firm had been appointed to represent him.31 
 
 20. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1260. 
 21. Id. at 1249; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 7. 
 22. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1249. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 1249 n.44. 
 25. Id. at 1250. 
 26. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
 27. Id. at 626–27. 
 28. Id. at 627. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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The Court in Jackson reiterated that “[t]he arraignment signals 
the ‘initiation of adversary judicial proceedings’ and thus the 
attachment of the Sixth Amendment.”32 The Court held that the 
detectives’ conduct, in approaching and then interrogating the 
defendant after his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached, 
was unconstitutional.33 Although the Court did not mention that a 
defendant must accept the right to counsel at the arraignment hearing 
in order to obtain Sixth Amendment protection,34 the Court noted in a 
footnote that “[t]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request 
by the defendant.”35 
In other cases the Court has briefly mentioned the idea of having 
to request counsel, but these cases do not resolve the issue of whether 
an affirmative request is required. In Michigan v. Harvey, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, stated that 
“once a defendant obtains or even requests counsel as respondent 
had here, analysis of the waiver [of counsel] issue changes.”36 In 
addition, the Court in Patterson v. Illinois stated that “as a matter of 
some significance . . . petitioner had not retained, or accepted by 
appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he was questioned 
by authorities.”37  
The Court’s most recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, 
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, did not address the issue of “requesting” 
or “accepting” counsel.38 The Court, however, stated: 
Jackson saw no need for lengthy disquisitions on the significance 
of the initial appearance, but that was because it found the 
attachment issue an easy one. . . . [There is] ‘no doubt’ that the 
right to counsel attached at the initial appearance, and Jackson 
said that the opposite result would be ‘untenable.’39 
IV.  HOLDING 
Over Montejo’s objection, the trial court admitted Montejo’s 
apology letter into evidence during Detective Hall’s direct 
 
 32. Id. at 620 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984)). 
 33. Id. at 636. 
 34. Id. at 633 n.6. 
 35. Id. (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)). 
 36. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352 (1990). 
 37. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988). 
 38. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008). 
 39. Id. at 2591 (citations omitted). 
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examination.40 On appeal, while reviewing the lower court’s factual 
findings, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attached at the September 10 hearing 
because, the court acknowledged, the hearing transcript “clearly 
shows that counsel was appointed.”41 The court found, however, that 
Montejo did not make an affirmative response at this hearing, but 
only “stood mute.”42 Therefore, according to the court, “although his 
right to counsel had attached, he did not assert his right to counsel 
such that the prophylactic rule of Michigan v. Jackson would 
invalidate any waiver he would later make.”43 
After finding that Montejo had not asserted his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, the court held that Montejo waived his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel because his decision not to assert it was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.44 The court reasoned that even if 
Montejo and the police did not know counsel had been appointed, 
“the giving of Miranda warnings and his subsequent waiver of those 
rights was sufficient to apprise him of his right to have counsel 
present at the interrogation and the consequences of a decision to 
proceed without the aid of counsel.”45 
Again, whether Montejo waived his Sixth Amendment rights is 
not at issue before the Supreme Court.46 Rather, because both parties 
agree that the police initiated the interrogation, the issue is whether 
Montejo should be afforded the prophylactic protections of Jackson—
striking down as unconstitutional the police-initiated interrogation 
that occurred after Montejo’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had 
attached.47 
 
 40. Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1250 (La. 2008). 
 41. Id. at 1260. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1261. A criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel can be waived; 
the waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. “A waiver is ordinarily an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether 
there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, 
and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
 44. Id. at 1262. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2008), available at 
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/07-01529qp.pdf. 
 47. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 1; Brief for Respondent at 9, Montejo v. 
Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Dec. 17, 2008). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/12/2009 9:01:44 AM 
298 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:293 
V.  ANALYSIS 
In reaching its decision that Montejo had not affirmatively 
accepted the counsel that was appointed to him, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court relied on Montoya v. Collins.48 In Montoya, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the prophylactic rule established in Jackson was 
inapplicable because the defendant, Montoya, had not asserted his 
right to counsel.49 The Fifth Circuit held that because Montoya 
remained silent after being appointed counsel at his arraignment, the 
police were not barred from initiating interrogation.50 The court 
explained that it would give a broad interpretation to a defendant’s 
request for counsel, but that interpretation was “only required when 
there [wa]s a ‘request’ or an ‘assertion’ in the first place.”51 
If the Supreme Court upholds the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
decision, the practical effect of Louisiana v. Montejo will be that 
defendants have to “assert” their right to counsel for the prophylactic 
rule of Michigan v. Jackson to come into play—even if, at their 
arraignment, a magistrate provides them no opportunity to speak, 
thereby equating silence with waiver. This puts criminal defendants in 
the illogical position of having to affirmatively request counsel after 
counsel has already been appointed to them. This could prove to be, 
as Montejo described in his brief, a “trap for the unwary.” 
The Louisiana Supreme Court did not address any of the benefits 
or burdens that could arise from their decision. The court simply held 
that what is required for the prophylactic rule of Jackson to come into 
play is an affirmative assertion by the defendant; because Montejo did 
not make any type of assertion, the prophylactic rule of Jackson 
barring police-initiated interrogation was not applicable in Montejo’s 
case.52 
The problem with the court’s opinion is that the court did not 
consider how its decision would affect the State of Louisiana.53 How 
will the decision affect criminal defendants, police officers, and public 
defenders offices? In Louisiana, police officers can now avoid the 
prophylactic rule of Jackson when defendants remain silent after 
 
 48. Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1261 n.68 (La. 2008). 
 49. Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 283. 
 52. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1261. 
 53. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 33, (“[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
approach would generate intractable problems of administration.”). 
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being appointed counsel at their arraignments. Must the public 
defenders in Louisiana now attend every arraignment or, at the very 
least, read every arraignment transcript to see if the criminal 
defendant did affirmatively accept counsel?54 
VI.  ARGUMENTS 
The State of Louisiana asserts that “[t]he attachment of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel should be distinct from the assertion of 
such right.”55 The State argues that it is not fair to apply the harsh rule 
of Michigan v. Jackson unless an affirmative request for counsel has 
been made by the defendant because “[j]ust as [Montejo] is entitled 
to be informed of his rights, the police are entitled to be adequately 
informed when a suspect desires to assert his right to counsel.”56 This 
is a strong, almost intuitive argument, but it is significantly weakened 
in Montejo’s case because there was a representative from the 
sheriff’s office present at Montejo’s arraignment.57 It is difficult to 
believe, therefore, that the Sheriff’s Department was not aware 
Montejo had been appointed counsel before taking him on a search 
for the murder weapon—especially when a representative from their 
department was present at a hearing where Montejo was 
unambiguously appointed counsel earlier that morning.58 
The State argues that the defendant’s interest in not being 
badgered by the police should be balanced against society’s interest in 
obtaining information regarding a crime.59 According to the State, 
requiring the defendant to affirmatively request counsel would not 
prove to be an unworkable standard, and could enhance police 
investigations.60 
The State argues that because the rule in Jackson, barring police-
initiated interrogation after a criminal defendant has obtained 
counsel, is prophylactic and not constitutional, the added protections 
afforded criminal defendants should be weighed against the potential 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 9. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.; Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 4. 
 58. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6–7. 
 59. Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 13–14. 
 60. Id. at 17 (“Contrary to Montejo’s assertion, silence of a defendant will not forfeit a 
constitutional protection. However, silence should not be equated with an outright bar to all 
police interrogation once counsel is appointed.”). 
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harm to criminal investigations—investigations that benefit society by 
deterring crime.61 Thus, according to the State, the protections in 
Jackson do not need to be completely over-hauled, but the Jackson 
rule should not be interpreted so broadly as to bar all police initiated 
interrogation after the Sixth Amendment attaches at arraignment. 
That way criminal defendants would still be afforded the protections 
of Jackson after they affirmatively request counsel, but the police 
would still be able to initiate interrogations—furthering their 
investigations and arguably benefiting society by reducing crime—
until the defendant requests counsel.62 
Montejo’s brief focused on three arguments, the first two of which 
were substantive and analyzed herein: 1) requiring criminal 
defendants to affirmatively request counsel before the protections of 
Michigan v. Jackson apply is illogical,63 a “trap for the unwary,”64 and 
unadministrable;65 2) the decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court is 
contrary to governing precedent;66 and 3) even if affirmative 
acceptance is required under the facts of this case, Montejo 
affirmatively accepted the appointment of counsel.67 These three 
arguments are also present in briefs submitted to the Court by the 
Louisiana Public Defender’s Association68 and the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.69 
Montejo’s first argument is perhaps the strongest. At Montejo’s 
arraignment he was appointed counsel by the court. Most criminal 
defendants would assume that this appointment confers the benefit of 
 
 61. Id. at 13–14. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 20–23. 
 64. Id. at 32. 
 65. Id. at 32–35. 
 66. Id. at 24–32. 
 67. Id. at 35–36. 
 68. See Brief of Amici Curiae The La. Pub. Defenders Ass’n in Support of Petitioner at 3, 
Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2008) (“Although the proceedings governing 
initial appearance and assignment of counsel vary throughout Louisiana’s districts, a common 
thread is that many do not seek affirmative acceptance from indigent defendants. For example, 
many appoint counsel automatically or through an indigency investigator. An affirmative 
acceptance requirement will have the practical effect of denying these indigent defendants 
counsel because they were never asked to accept counsel and will not understand the necessity 
of this formality.”). 
 69. See Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner at 9, Montejo, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2008) (“The Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
approach is unfair because different jurisdictions follow different policies and practices in the 
appointment of counsel, and these policies and practices often determine whether or not a 
defendant makes an explicit request for counsel on the record.”). 
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consulting with counsel.70 In fact, the most logical action by the 
criminal defendant could be to sit in silence for the rest of the hearing 
after the court has appointed an attorney.71  
 The criminal defendant’s presumption that by remaining silent he 
has accepted the attorney appointed to him is even stronger if he was 
not given a chance to speak at the arraignment. When a criminal 
defendant, such as Montejo, is interrogated by the police hours after 
being appointed counsel, the criminal defendant could conclude 
either that the attorney is not coming or that he is obligated to 
participate in the police initiated interrogation. Thus, the court’s 
requiring an affirmative response to the appointment, as was the case 
with Montejo, is capable of creating a “trap for the unwary.”72 
Second, Montejo argued that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
decision is contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson 
v. Illinois.73 In Patterson the defendant did not request a lawyer and 
had not been appointed one. Under those circumstances, the Court 
held that the police could initiate interrogation, and that the 
defendant had waived his Sixth Amendment rights by signing a 
Miranda waiver. The Court, however, noted that the defendant was 
not “an accused [who] has [a] lawyer” because once a defendant has a 
lawyer “a distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving 
the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes effect.” Thus, as 
Montejo notes in his brief “Patterson specifically cited Jackson’s 
prohibition on police-initiated interrogations as one of the protections 
that arises when a defendant ‘has’ a lawyer.”74 
VII.  DISPOSITION 
To predict how the Court may decide Montejo v. Louisiana, it is 
helpful to look at the Court’s most recent Sixth Amendment decision 
in Rothgery v. Gillespie County.75 There, the Court held that a criminal 
defendant’s first appearance in front of a magistrate marks the point 
where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.76 The majority 
opinion was written by Justice Souter, and joined by seven other 
 
 70. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 21. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 20–21. 
 73. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988). 
 74. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24 (quoting id. at 290 n.3 (citations omitted)).  
 75. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008). 
 76. Id. at 2581. 
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justices—only Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.77 Rothgery 
indicates that a broad array of Sixth Amendments protections kick in 
at the time of appointment of counsel.78 
Rothgery does not address whether an affirmative response is 
required after the right to counsel attaches,79 but for a defendant in 
Montejo’s circumstances, Rothgery does give several hints about how 
each Justice interprets the jurisprudence of Jackson.80 The majority 
favorably cited Jackson numerous times in its opinion,81 and that there 
was no mention in Rothgery of requiring a defendant to “accept” an 
appointment of counsel may indicate that the Court will be unwilling 
to accept Louisiana’s argument in Montejo.82 There were no 
indications in the Court’s Rothgery opinion that it wanted to limit the 
scope of Jackson by requiring criminal defendants to affirmatively 
accept counsel. 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both filed concurring 
opinions in Rothgery.83 Chief Justice Roberts’s one paragraph 
concurrence, which Justices Scalia and Alito joined, simply stated that 
he saw no need to overturn the Jackson decision.84 Justice Alito’s 
concurrence, like the majority opinion, did not appear to lend any 
credence to Louisiana’s argument in Montejo.85 Justice Alito never 
mentioned the criminal defendant’s need to accept appointment of 
counsel—even though his concurrence discussed Jackson at length: “I 
interpret the Sixth Amendment to require the appointment of counsel 
only after the defendant’s prosecution has begun.”86 
Because eight Justices are unwilling to overturn the Jackson 
decision,87 and because none indicate that they would require 
defendants to affirmatively accept appointment of Jackson,88 it seems 
likely that the Court will rule in favor of Montejo. The State’s 
 
 77. Id. at 2596–2605 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 2591 (majority opinion) (“Once attachment occurs, the accused at least is entitled 
to the presence of appointed counsel during any ‘critical stage’ of the postattachment 
proceedings. . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 79. Id. at 2578–93. 
 80. See id.(citing to Jackson favorably more than twenty times). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2578. 
 84. Id. at 2592 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 85. See id. at 2592–95 (Alito, J. concurring). 
 86. Id. at 2594. 
 87. See id. at 2578–93 (majority opinion). 
 88. See id. 
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strongest argument is that society benefits from enhanced police 
investigations, and that requiring criminal defendants to affirmatively 
accept appointment of counsel is not sufficiently burdensome to 
justify compromising these investigations.89 This argument, however, 
seems to cut against the spirit of Jackson—affording criminal 
defendants greater Sixth Amendment protection once they become 
an accused.90 
The whole issue of affirmatively accepting counsel would appear 
to be resolved if the magistrate would, at first appearance, simply ask 
the defendant if he wants to have counsel appointed—if the 
defendant says yes, then Jackson becomes applicable.91 In Montejo’s 
situation, however, it seems peculiar, and perhaps a “trap for the 
unwary,”92 not to ask Montejo any direct questions, appoint him 
counsel while he is present, and then require him at some later date to 
affirmatively accept this appointment. Surely the logical conclusion 
drawn by Montejo was that by not saying anything when counsel was 
appointed, that he accepted this appointment. And perhaps the most 
persuasive fact suggesting that Montejo was being represented by 
counsel is that when he arrived back to the Sheriff’s Office after his 
trip with detectives to look for the murder weapon, Montejo’s public 
defender was waiting to speak with him and was upset with the 
detectives.93 
The Jackson Court went to great lengths to ensure that criminal 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are protected.94 Thus, with such 
 
 89. Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 13–14. 
 90. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986) (“[A]fter a formal accusation has 
been made—and a person who had previously been just a ‘suspect’ has become an ‘accused’ 
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment—the constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel is of such importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting 
information from an uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier 
stage of their investigation.”). 
 91. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 21 (“[I]ndigent defendants in Louisiana are 
not asked if they want a lawyer—they are told they have a lawyer. So they have no occasion at 
the hearing to express their desire for counsel’s assistance. Nor are defendants informed that 
they must make an affirmative gesture of acceptance in order to secure the protections of the 
Sixth Amendment.”). 
 92. Id. at 20–21. 
 93. See id. at 9 (“After Montejo finished the letter to the victim’s spouse, the detectives 
ended the car ride. When they returned to the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office, they found 
Montejo’s lawyer waiting for them.”). 
 94. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632 (“[G]iven the plain language of the Amendment and its 
purpose of protecting the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary, our 
conclusion that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial criminal 
proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is only at that time that the government has 
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compelling facts suggesting that Montejo was represented by counsel, 
the current Court, which continues to support the Jackson decision, 95 
will likely strike down the Louisiana Supreme Court’s affirmative 
acceptance requirement because it is an unnecessary formality, a “trap 
for the unweary,” for criminal defendants who have already been 
appointed a lawyer. 
 
 
committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and 
defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial 
forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural 
criminal law.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 95. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2578–93 (2008) (citing to Jackson 
favorably more than twenty times). 
